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LOUIS DUMONT ON THE
NATIONAL VARIANTS OF
THE MODERN IDEOLOGY : I
Leonidas Donskis
J'ai ainsi contraste le Franfais: « J e suis homme par
nature et franfais par accident», et l'Allemand: « J e suis
essentiellement un Allemand, et je suis un homme grace a
ma qualite d'Allemand [...].» *
Louis Dumont
One of the most interesting and, to be sure, controversial cases in current
civilizational sociology is that of Louis Dumont. Both his incisive analytical
perspective and, at first sight, the quite unusual, even theoretically unconventional analysis of the rise of modern individualism conceived as the very
basis of modern ideology deserve to be treated as one of the most profound
and challenging theoretical phenomena at the end of the twentieth century.
The latter, which acquires its special place in the modern history of
humankind as the age of the rise and fall of the most militant and exclusive
ideologies, in the case of both Dumont's civilizational paradigm and critique
of modernity undoubtedly has found its most profound and fundamental
criticism.
It is not necessary to describe in detail both Dumont's approach and
research strategy. It has been done in a number of analytical reviews'. In one
of the most incisive interpretations of Dumont's theoretical construction,
Vytautas Kavolis has placed his emphasis on the theoretical framework
within which Dumont's conceptually impressive and theoretically elegant
construction arose. He puts the origin of Dumont's approach as follows:
Louis Dumont's approach, in studies dating back to the 1950's, derives from
Emile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss and is conceived within the French tradition of
structuralism. It has, however, evolved since the shift in his research from the cognitive organization of the civilization of India to the intellectual history of the
* Louis Dumont, Homo Aequalis, II: L'ideologic allemande.

France-Allemagne et retour (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), p. 15.
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West into a stance that can be described as 'historicized Durkheimian.' In his more
detailed attention to historical processes of consciousness formation, Dumont has
moved closer to Max Weber, from whom, however, he remains separated by his
rejection of methodological individualism. Dumont is less concerned, in this later
stage, with the ideological structures and their effects upon social organization than
with a precise identification of changes within ideological structures, and (more
speculatively) with the practical implications of these changes.
2

The so-called "first wave" of cross-cultural studies basically represented
by cultural morphology (Ruckert, Danilevsky, Frobenius, Spengler) and historico-cultural monadology (Toynbee) has come to employ the concepts and
terms of one civilization - as a matter of fact, those of the modern West - in
comparative studies of essentially different civilizations. The "second wave"
has come to stress the crucial importance of strict distinguishing between
ontologically and socioculturally diverse civilizations as well as between
their basic (as Dumont would say, ideological) principles.
From this point of view, Dumont may be defined as a true representative
of the "second wave." He seems far indeed from the numerous nomothetic
prejudices about the alleged laws of history, its predestined course and its
predictability. Dumont is the ideographic analyst par excellence. His
extreme attentiveness to both the unique ideological principle and the empirical evidence of comparative civilizations makes him a distinctive theoretician not only in contemporary sociology and cross-cultural studies but also
in current social philosophy and, generally speaking, the realm of social
knowledge.
We should note the basic methodological and even epistemological differences among strategies of research as they are represented by theoreticians of the "second wave" in current cross-cultural studies. It is small wonder that Kavolis in his comparative analysis of Dumont's and Eisenstadt's
civilizational sociologies notes that:
[...] when sociologists, in approaching any issue, take civilizations as the
frame of analysis within which the issue is located, they may be concerned
with that which makes particular civilizations what they are, or with civilizations as merely sources of information to be exploited for building general sociological theory. (This is one way of describing the ideographicnomothetic distinction [italics mine].) The publication of examinations of
the same issue - the rise of modern individualism - by two of the currently
most active civilizational sociologists allows us a point of entry into a comparison of two modes of being of civilizational sociology.
Dumont seems to have never been involved with the worship of theoretical fashions or methodological innovations. He manifests both his epistemic program and theoretical frame of analysis in the realm of holism in its
3
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primary, authentic shape. The latter, to take it in a strict sense and as precisely as Dumont does, is a method of social knowledge frequently confused
with, or contaminated by, its absolute opposite, nominalism, rather than
merely a weak echo of the Western cognitive voice of the past completely
rejected by contemporary social sciences, or even sacrificed in the name of
the advantages of nominalism. At this point, the role of Dumont consists in
recovering the key concepts of social knowledge in their essentially primary meanings rather than in their conscious subverting. The value of
Dumont's thinking lies in purifying a set of basic concepts, not in any
alleged challenging of it.
This may be said, first of all, about the two basic concepts he has
employed in his civilizational studies, those of hierarchy and equality. (In
Dumont's theory, holism is derived from the former, nominalism, or individualism, from the latter.) They are in turn essentially connected to
Dumont's general strategy of research. According to Kavolis,
4

Dumont's [strategy of research] is a two-stage, expanding strategy. He first,
through an exhaustive investigation of the empirical evidence of a particular civilization, identifies the basic ideological principle from which its
coherence derives. (In the case of India, it is the principle of hierarchy.) He
then analyzes a second civilization by comparing its empirical evidence
with the ideological principle of the civilization first considered. Through
this comparison, he sharpens his understanding of the ideological principle
of the second civilization (in the case of the West, it is equality), and also
recovers a grasp of that in the second civilization which it represses but
which the first has more fully developed.
5

For Dumont, hierarchy as a method of organization of the social whole
corresponds with holism as taking the social whole (society) rather than as
a particular individual as the basic unit of social research; thus equality corresponds with nominalism, or individualism. Dumont, a holist par excellence by his theoretical skill and intellectual vocation, is thus able to uncover the real content of a number of notions that are taken for granted in the
predominant type (obviously nominalistic) of modern Western theoretical
discourse.
Let us start observing Dumont's concept of ideology as well as his conception of the national variants of the modern ideology. Both of these issues
are hardly detachable from each other. Our emphasis will be placed on what
the obvious and hidden theoretical implications of Dumont's discourse are
referring to. A crucial question arising in the framework within which
Dumont's conception of the rise and culmination of modern individualism,
i.e. modern ideology itself, will be considered as follows: is his vision
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994
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applicable to analyses of other national variants of the modern ideology? We
set aside his early works on the civilization of India as well as its caste system. We will be concerned with Dumont's contribution to the intellectual
history of the West.
The Dumontian Notion of Modern Ideology: Its Origins, its
Outline, and its Implications
In his studies of the symbolic organization of a particular civilization,
Dumont takes ideology as the basic unit of civilizational approach. The last
thing he would entertain is anxiety about the well-known pejorative meaning of this term. In Dumontian discourse, ideology naturally acquires its
neutral scientific meaning uncovering the deepest structures of historical
consciousness. It is considered as merely the basic principle of civilization
determining its inner coherence.
Dumont seems to have never looked for how - and whether - ideological
structures and designs contaminate the alleged purity and primary innocence
of the axial ideas (to recall Jaspers' term) including theoretical concepts and
philosophical constructions. For Dumont, the "extraordinary potency of the
initial disposition" in establishing the ideological principle of a civilization
is too serious a problem to reduce it to speculations about the fundamental
priority of theoretical knowledge over human spontaneity, stances and selfconsciousness. "I call ideology a system of ideas and values current in a
given social milieu. [...] What is a predominant ideology? It is not exactly
the ideology of a majority of the people nor something stable that would be
seen to underline historical changes. It is rather something that comes spontaneously to the mind of people living in the cultural milieu considered,
something in terms of which those people speak and think, and which is best
revealed by comparison with other cultures [italics mine]."
The theoretical background of this problem may shed light on why
Dumont's notion of the modern ideology deserves to be considered as
extremely important. Shall we go back to the above highly pejorative meaning the concept of ideology has acquired in modern theoretical discourse?
Ideology as such has been taken most critically by Marxism (in the case
of neo-Marxism essentially represented by the Frankfurt School it has done
so while simultaneously adopting a panideological framework) and positivism, especially the logical empiricism, or Vienna Circle, as its most
advanced and latest branch. As it will be shown below, it is not a simple
coincidentia oppositorum.
For Marxism ideology seemed to represent a "false" consciousness, or
the world turned upside down, while for positivism it seemed to function in
6
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the system of true, verifiable knowledge as a para-theory lacking strict, clear
criteria of verification and therefore unable to be of epistemic value. The followers of these two ways of thinking (that is, of these two influential
methodologies) still continue interpreting ideology in a negative sense, or
placing the term in the negative context of meanings producing pejorative
connotations.
No wonder that Karl Raimund Popper as a former representative of logical empiricism has "subtracted" all holistic, essentialistic phenomena,
including metaphysics, ideologies and Utopias, from the realm of scientifically, that is empirically, verifiable truth. One wonders how (and by what
conceptual framework) Popper was able to construct his well-known concept of the third world identified with the world of ideas, or the world of culture (according to the later Popper), by eliminating all idea-making phenomena. (I set aside a principal question: how is it possible to constitute a
theory of history based on methodological individualism, or nominalism, if
taken in its pure and primary shape, i.e. not mixed with elements of holistic
thinking? This problem deserves to be reflected on as the subject of a separate study. It will be discussed - at least, in some respects - below.)
On the other hand, it should be noted that a naive, superficial juxtaposition of the "open" society and the "closed" one (introduced by Henri
Bergson) did play its significant role - and still continues doing so, particularly in the East-Central European countries - discrediting ideology. Ideology is no longer being explored in clear and neutral terms. This split
between ideology and analytical discourse threatens to leave the former outside the zone of the analytical language because ideology, with minor exceptions, is no longer considered as a subject of neutral studies, or as a cultural
system (except in such instances as Clifford Geertz's works on this subject).
In the post-war world ideology came to refer either to totalitarianism (or,
at least, authoritarianism) or to the indoctrination of a particular social group
or even of a whole society. This is to say, ideology is now placed within an
ideological discourse. In other words, the prescriptive system is being
locked up within itself, that is, within the same prescriptive system. (To use
Dumont's terms, the hierarchical complementarity evidently drops out here:
nominalism, completely separated from holism and left alone, is not able to
explain itself. A question may arise: is holism able to do so? This issue will
be examined below.) But as a matter of fact, ideology is unable to explicate
itself.
In short, we are in. the following paradoxical situation: discourse for discourse's sake, and ideology for ideology's sake. This circulum vitiosus or
methodological tautology, is a widespread phenomenon and constitutes the
second reason for the lack of rational light shed on modern ideology.
8 9
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Let us go back to Dumont, His theoretical stance directed to the exploration of both ideology and its deepest structures, lurking in the philosophical layer of ideas as well as in the common sense, remains outside of various kinds of theoretical and analytical hypertrophy. The only thing from a
Marxist interpretation of ideology he uses is the common aspect of ideological dissemination: "any ideology is a social set of representations." On the
other hand, a strict distinction between ideology and "truth," as it has been
offered by positivism, is absolutely unacceptable for Dumont.
In his From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of Economic
Ideology Dumont has presented a wide-scale explication of modern ideology including its global aspect as well as a specified one. He writes:
I define ideology as the totality of ideas and values - or 'representations' common to a society or current in a given social group. [...] It is probably
expected [...] that I should distinguish more or less substantially between
ideology, on the one hand, and science, or rationality, or truth, or philosophy, on the other. To make such a distinction is the last thing I would do.
The only aspect common to the present view and a widespread, more or
less Marxist, usage is the social relativity: any ideology is a social set of
representations - certainly a very complex affair. The fact that one particular representation in that set is judged as true or false, rational or traditional, scientific or not, is irrelevant to the social nature of the idea or value.
For example: that the earth revolves around the sun is, I take it, a scientific statement, but it is admitted by most of our contemporaries without their
being able to demonstrate it. Moreover, even for those who are able to do
so, this statement is part of their world view, together with many other
statements they cannot demonstrate. As such, it may legitimately be taken
as an integral part of the ideology as a whole, that is, as entertaining certain relations with other components of it.
10

One would think that the term ideology in Dumont's usage is nothing but
a substitute for the commonly accepted concept of Weltanschauung. But this
can hardly be true. The latter term, as we all know, derives from the rationalist approach as widespread in the German tradition of theoretical thought
(it is purified from what in the history of mentalities is considered as mentality rather than as idea and value; it is not accidental that Dumont has come
to stress the importance of value-ideas in both the symbolic organization and
the basic ideological principle of a particular civilization.
The distinction of crucial importance for adequate understanding of the
Dumontian notion of modern ideology is that between sociological thought
and economic one. For Dumont, the latter arises as a pure expression of
nominalism, while the former, by its nature and definition, is a phenomenon
of holism. By employing his sharp terms and then by liberating himself from
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol31/iss31/2
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the widespread opinions concerning the initially holistic origin of Marxian
thinking, Dumont allows us to observe the rise of economic ideology conceived by him as the last and the most influential historical transformation
(as Dumont would say, "through a historical choice") of modern individualism. He formulates one of his crucial questions and then explicitly answers
it:
Is Marx, in our terms, individualist or holist? At first sight, the collectivist or communist aspect of his thought appears to put the stress on the social whole so much
that, if we ask our contemporaries, they will classify him spontaneously as holist. I
contend that this is only an appearance, reinforced perhaps through the fact that the
person who asks the question perceives Marx as more holist than himself. For
instance, this would seem to be the case for a student in the United States. My thesis, which I propose to test here, is that Marx is essentially individualist. This insight
emerged a few years ago in connection with studies in the social history of India. As
I wished to draw a sharp distinction between sociological thought (in my view,
essentially holistic) and economic thought (essentially individualistic), I was led to
doubt the accepted view that Marx was one of the founders of sociology and to conclude that he is not an economic sociologist, but a sociological economist [...]."
Dumont seems to have never employed his analytical discourse to
uncover and then clarify the role and place of social philosophy and its
branches, or rather its applied disciplines (political philosophy, philosophy
of law, etc.), in the "historical choices" and, in general, in the historic
process of the rise of modern ideology. His implications concerning the
German philosophies of history and culture are extremely interesting and
far-reaching. His observations on Hobbes, Rousseau, Kant, and Locke are of
great theoretical importance even for academic philosophy, not to speak of
the history of ideas or civilizational sociology.
They remind us of a well-done set of ideas exceptionally useful for
Dumont in exemplifying both his highly sophisticated, elegant theoretical
construction and undoubtfully profound, paradoxical argument but, at the
same time, they are loosely bound with the modern social philosophy per se.
It goes without saying that the great economic and sociological theories are
not social philosophy-free (it may also be said about Dumont himself). It
would be really a magnificent step forward of contemporary social knowledge if someone were to apply Dumont's own method in defining the role
and place of social philosophy in the emergence and culmination of modern
ideology. But this kind of analysis still remains to be done.
As noted above, the essence of modern ideology, according to Dumont,
lies in individualism. A couple of questions may arise: how about nationalism which seems to be the very nucleus of modern ideology? Is individualism so easily compatible with the search for collective identity that took the
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994
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place of individualism - particularly during the last two centuries? One wonders how it is possible to consider individualism as the axis of modern ideology when the individual in the twentieth century has been frequently sacrificed in the name of such collective bodies of history as a state, a nation,
to say nothing about a number of messianic projects?
But Dumont easily destroys this illusion of the weakness of his theoretical construction. First, empirical evidence is a dubious argument against
Dumont: the incisiveness of his analytical perspective as well as his attentiveness to historical fact may destroy any empirical counter-argument. In
his theory, both the former and the latter correspond to each other almost
perfectly. (The only sign of weakness in his theoretical design we will be
discussing below is rather a certain arbitrariness in the collecting of the facts
exemplifying his axial thesis.) Second, it should never be forgotten that
Dumont may be criticized only by using the sociological discourse, not an
ordinary one consisting mainly of accepted opinions and prejudices. The
above inadequacy of these discourses to each other has been successfully
demonstrated by Dumont in his Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology
in Anthropological Perspective. He notes:
Let us take an example to show the difference between ordinary discourse and the sociological discourse we have in mind. Without explanation,
someone contrasts individualism to nationalism. He probably means that
nationalism evokes a group sentiment that is generally contrasted to 'individualistic' sentiment. The basic sociological fact, however, is that nation, in

the precise modern sense of the term, and nationalism, as distinct from mere
patriotism, are historically conjoined with individualism as a value. The
nation is precisely the type of global society which corresponds to the para-

mountcy of the individual as value. Not only does the one historically
accompany the other, but the interdependence between them is clear, so that
we may say that the nation is a global society composed of people who think
of themselves as individuals [italics mine] [...].
12

The so-called ordinary discourse seems not always to have been theoryfree. It would be quite enough to recall that, for instance, Popper's The Open
Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism have evoked enormously critical assessments of both holism and methodological essentialism
(in Popper's view, responsible for the emergence of totalitarianism - at this
point, Popper and Dumont seem to be absolute opposites, the two incompatible poles between whom a creative dialogue is hardly possible;
Dumont's Essays on Individualism as well as his Homo Aequalis, II:
L'ideologie allemande may be called The Anti-Popper.) Such terms as "historicism," "holism," "nominalism" have even entered the political dishttps://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol31/iss31/2

8

Donskis: Louis Dumont on the National Variants of the Modern Ideology: I

10

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

course. This is why the uncovering of the real place of both holism and
individualism in exercising power still remains to be achieved. Dumont
might have been concerned with the complicated and many-sided interaction between theoretical discourse and ordinary one. Is the increasing of
one's power the main link between them? As a matter of fact, Dumont's
method, to the contrary of nominalism, would allow him to do this. The
structural historian of ideas, for whom the realm of ideas appears as the
autonomous reality, would be able to point out the relations between discourses, not only between ideas that vary from text to text, from discourse
to discourse.
11

Nominalism, in fact, is just another name for individualism, or rather
one of its facets. What we propose is to analyze it, but it refuses to be analyzed: in this sense there is no way out of the disagreement. Nominalism will
know only John, Peter, and Paul. But John, Peter, and Paul are men only by
virtue of the relations that exist between them. So, to go back to our own
problem: in a given text, or in such-and-such an author, there are ideas
linked by certain relations, and without these relations to obliterate the ideas
will not exist. In every case the relations form a configuration, and these
configurations vary from text to text, from author to author, from one milieu
to another, but they do not vary as chalk does from cheese, and we can try
to see what they have in common at each level of generalization.
14

However, one of the crucial questions still remains unanswered: if nominalism, according to Dumont, is not able to explain or reflect itself, how
about holism? Is it able to do so? We should keep in mind that any holistic
construction may not be explained in depth, if separated from the experience
of the theoretician himself. This experience always remains individual and
unique. The history of consciousness is hardly able to write itself using individuals as subordinated, insignificant historic actors in accord and with
some Zeitgeist. Such a Hegelian notion would be far away from Dumont's
own vision of the history of consciousness.
In Dumont's view, methodology inevitably corresponds to ideology and
vice versa. In my view, it implies the well-known phenomenological statement (in a different theoretical context it may well be identified as the existentialist stance) pointing out that behind even the most sophisticated rationality something irrational always stands. The Dumontian notion of modern
ideology allows us to believe that the hidden relations between ideas, but not
ideas themselves, are the very basis of the symbolic configuration of every
ideology. It is not clear if such an implication would be acceptable to
Dumont himself but it leads us to the working hypothesis that the search for
hierarchical complementarity is the only way to reconcile even, one would
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1994
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11
think, the contrasting, incompatible opposites, lurking in every ideological
configuration, to each other.
The next implication I would like to demonstrate would be that of relationship between individualism and nationalism. As shown above, nationalism is considered by Dumont as merely the hypostasized individualism.
Does it not mean that the most rigid and militant forms of nationalism usually are being exercised in those countries (to use Dumont's own terms, in
those national variants of modern ideology, or in those subcultures of
European culture) that have never experienced Western individualism in its
primary, authentic shape? In other words, does it not mean that a phenomenon of historical tardiness (namely, in the East-Central European countries)
is being left outside of Dumont's sight? An implication of the Dumontian
notion of modern ideology would be of great significance in interpreting the
above configurations that "vary from text to text, from author to author, from
one milieu to another."
The weakness of the Dumontian concept of modern ideology paradoxically may be found at the same point where he is the strongest contemporary
civilizational analyst - in his analytical language. It would be quite enough
to replace one or two of Dumont's key terms to undermine the viability of
his elegant and subtle construction.
Let us take an example to show the interdependence between Dumont's
vision of the modern Western civilization and his terms employed to identify its basic ideological principle. The passage to be quoted may well be
called the fundamental theoretical framework within which Dumont's studies of modern ideology are being organized.
[...] it is argued that we cannot in practice grasp an object that is as complex
and vague as the configuration of ideas and values we are envisioning, that
such a configuration does not really exist and is nothing but an arbitrary construct of the mind. Just as there is really no such thing as a people's mind,
or spirit, it will be said, so there can be no such things as a common configuration of ideas and values beyond all the differences between individuals,
social milieux, epochs, schools of thought, different languages, and distinct
national cultures. Experience, however, teaches us to the contrary, since on
the one hand there has been and there is historical continuity and intercommunication, and on the other - as Mauss and especially Karl Polanyi have
15

16

ascertained - modern civilization differs radically from other civilizations
and cultures. The truth is that our culture is permeated by nominalism,
which grants real existence only to individuals and not to relations, to elements and not to sets of elements, [italics mine].
17

One wonders how (and, as Foucault would say, for what purposes)
Dumont did manage without the concept of freedom in identifying the basic
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol31/iss31/2

10

Donskis: Louis Dumont on the National Variants of the Modern Ideology: I

12

COMPARATIVE CIVILIZATIONS REVIEW

ideological principle of modern civilization. It is not hard to take a guess that
he would identify freedom as merely an aspect of both individualism and
equality. Freedom, however, unavoidably implies relations between individuals, not only a recognition of completely atomized individuals. I am free
insofar as I recognize the other's freedom - this classical liberal notion of
freedom obviously implies not only the principle of equality but also the
principle of one's responsibility to preserve freedom as a common value.
Nothing but freedom is able to associate individuals into communities and
then make a society coherent and therefore possible.
Freedom may not be reduced only to its external, i.e. social, representations. It undoubtedly has its internal, i.e. metaphysical, dimension without
which it would be impossible to explain either how human consciousness
enters the transcendence, or the absolute dimension of the supreme being, or
how human conscience (in the case of secular liberalism) reflects itself in
taking responsibility for one's individual stance in the ensemble of social
relations.
It seems to me that it would not be necessary to insist upon the religious
origin of individualism (that throughout the Christian history of the West it
has been transformed from the ideology of an outworldly individual into that
of an inworldly individual). Since it seems to be a conditio sine qua non of
Dumont's conception, it would be quite enough to recall the Christian notion
of the individuality of both human sin and his/her responsibility that lie at
the very basis of the Christian theology and ontology.
Does it mean that freedom and hierarchy completely deny each other and
therefore are incompatible in principle? A presence of the beginnings of
individualism - and respectively of freedom - in the Chinese and Japanese
civilizations (traditionally based on the powerful legacy of hierarchy) does
not allow us to be so quick in insisting upon the incompatibility of these
basic ideological principles.' A danger appears in trying to ignore or confuse
sociocultural levels within which both principles are functioning. Dumont's
"theoretical" and "practical" levels in hierarchical complementarity make
such an implication quite possible.
As we have seen, there is no place for a fundamental concept of freedom
in the realm of Dumont's holistic thinking. Our question - how is it possible
to detach the problem of freedom from that of individualism and equality? deserves to be considered in a separate study on this issue. It is obvious that
a structural historian of ideas should not be outside of the crucial philosophical questions. I guess that Dumont's response would be as follows:
"[...] the sociologist would tend to give prominence to religion as against
philosophy, because religion encompasses the whole of society and relates
immediately to action. Max Weber did this.'"
8

9
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13

Does it mean that sociology - at least, in both the Durkheimian and the
Dumontian sense - is being left outside of freedom as an ontological nucleus of the human being-in-the world? I do not think so. The point perhaps is
that Dumont's conceptual arrangement seems to exist as long as it is
designed by a specifically Dumontian set of concepts and terms; by employing even one element of analytical discourse alien to that of Dumont his elegant and sophisticated theoretical construction would be demolished as a
house of cards. Its strength springs upfront the closed analytical discourse.
From this point of view, a Dumontian holism should be defined as holism
sensu stricto.
As shown above, the will-to-transcendence conceived as the metaphysical basis of freedom remains a concept without content without taking freedom as an immanent quality of creative mind. "There is no doubt about the
fundamental conception of man that flowed from the teaching of Christ: as
Troeltsch said, man is an individual-in-relation-to-God: for our purposes
this means that man is in essence an outworldly individual." Later Dumont
explicates Troeltsch's presupposition:
20

The subject matter is familiar, and I shall only isolate schematically a
few critical features. It follows from Christ's and then Paul's teaching that
the Christian is an "individual-in-relation-to-God." There is, Troeltsch says,
"absolute individualism and absolute universalism" in relation to God. The
individual soul receives eternal value from its filial relationship to God, in
which relationship is also grounded human fellowship: Christians meet in
Christ, whose members they are. This tremendous affirmation takes place in

a level that transcends the world of man and of social institutions, although

these are also from Cod. The infinite worth of the individual is at the same
time the disparagement, the negation in terms of value, of the world as it is:
a dualism is posited, a tension is established that is constitutive of
Christianity and will endure throughout history [italics mine].
21

One of the most interesting distinctions Dumont offers is that between
philosophical individualism and religious one. "It is commonly admitted
that the transition in philosophical thought from Plato [alas, we cannot find
any word of Dumont's assessment of Plato's model of hierarchy based on
the combination of elements extracted from the ancient Egyptian and
Spartan social order, as it is depicted in Plato's Republic] and Aristotle to the
new schools of the Hellenistic period shows a discontinuity, a great gap - the
surge of individualism [...]. Self-sufficiency, which Plato and Aristotle
regarded as an attribute of the polis, becomes an attribute of the individual
[...] that is either assumed as a fact or posited as an ideal by Epicureans,
Cynics, and Stoics."
22
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To the contrary of Toynbee for whom the withdrawal-and-return as an
exceptional existential rhythm of creative minorities seemed to be applicable to every civilization, Dumont finds the Stoic quite different from the
Indian renouncer of the world. We may see that even if the former "has
returned to the world in a manner foreign to the Indian renouncer, it represents for him only a secondary accommodation while at bottom he still
defines himself as a stranger to the world."
23

How can we understand the genesis of this philosophical individualism? Individualism is so taken for granted that in this instance it is commonly
seen without more ado as a consequence of the ruin of the Greek polis and
of the unification of the world - Greeks and foreigners of barbarians confounded - under Alexander. Now this tremendous historical event can explain
many traits, but not, to me at least, the emergence of the individual as a
value, as a creation ex nihilo. We should look first of all to philosophy itself.
Not only have Hellenistic teachers occasionally lifted out of the Presocratics
elements for their own use, not only are they heirs to the Sophists and other
currents of thought that appear to us as submerged in the classical period, but
philosophical activity, the sustained exercise if rational inquiry carried out
by generations of thinkers, must by itself have fostered individualism,
because reason, universal in principle, is in practice at work through the
particular person who exercises it, and takes precedence, at least implicitly,
over everything else [italics mine].
24

Dumont's presuppositions thus would lead us to an implication that philosophy as such is a sign of modernity and therefore may not be considered
as a typical case in the development of humanity. It in turn encourages us to
accept an even more radical implication of the Dumontian notion of modern
ideology: the emancipation of individual consciousness conceived by him as
the rise of individualism is but a chronological limits-free, universal tendency of both human consciousness and his/her being-in-the world. This is why
modernity as a phenomenon sui generis may hardly be locked up only within the modern West. Dumont's method seems to be sufficiently flexible to
employ it in studies of the rise of modernity both in various historical epochs
and in diverse civilizational contexts.
As the Dumontian notion of modern ideology manifests itself as a mirror of his analytical discourse (as noted above, for Dumont, methodology
and ideology are complementary phenomena rather than incompatible opposites), his choosing of themes for analytical articulation is not ideologyfree. It seems to be the main reason why Dumont consciously remains outside of the realm of Western Utopian thought. It is not difficult to observe
how far Dumont is from the Christian idea of "changing the world."
25
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According to him, "in a comparative perspective the idea of 'changing the
world' looks so absurd that we come to realize that it could appear only in a
civilization which had for long implacably maintained the absolute distinction between the life promised to man and the one he actually lives. This
modern folly has its roots in what has been called the absurdity of the
cross."
In other words, Dumont arose as a very special Dumontian case. Both his
notion of ideology and criticism of modernity reflect an awareness by a contemporary theoretician of threats and dangers that sprang from an enormous
increase of power as well as from an exercising of power for power's sake.
As a causal explanation seems to be hopelessly inadequate to understanding
what happened in the history of the modern world, an ideographic consideration remains the only way for uncovering the inner, hidden logic of history. "As for us, let us leave aside all considerations of cause and effect and
consider only configurations of ideas and values, ideological networks, to
try and reach the basic relations on which they are built."
Dumont's notion of ideology is double-sided: his notion remains paradoxically close to the Marxian by stressing the social relativity of any ideology (there cannot be any dichotomy of truth and value); on the other side,
it arises as a specifically Dumontian (with some neo-Kantian methodological implications) phenomenon by stressing the uniqueness and individuality
of every subculture or national variant. The latter is to be discussed next.
(Part 2 of this article will appear in a 1995 issue of the journal).
26
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4. In modern philosophy, a critique of holism seems to have been exercised as the
hidden form of criticism directed toward the so-called radical historicism (identified,
as a rule, with Hegelism and Marxism). On this issue, see Karl Raimund Popper, The
Poverty of Historicism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979).
It is interesting to note that Popper takes Marxism as the paradigmatical instance
of holism (or of essentialism), while Dumont following Pribram's definition has
come to see Marxism as merely a pseudo-holism (in Pribram's own terms, a pseudouniversalism). See Louis Dumont, Essays on Individualism: Modern Ideology in
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Approach," in John A. Hall and I.C. Jannie, eds., Transition to Modernity: Essays on
Power, Wealth and Belief (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 259.
8. A number of the strict critics of ideology (identified, as a rule, with Communist
ideology) from the East-Central European countries might have been enormously
influenced by Popper's two pontifical works - those of The Open Society and Its
Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism. In Lithuania, even the titles of Popper's
books have recently been transformed into devices of the West-oriented intellectuals.
Instead of critically studying and, consequently, conceptually criticizing both
Hegelian and Marxian thought, they "gave notice to quit" permanently repeating
Popper's statements - by the way, obviously simplified, - as if they were magister
dixit-type formulae. By a great paradox. Popper seems to take the former place of
Marx within the academic life of these countries.
9. In East-Central European countries, even the term of ideology is not favored.
Moreover, it is dubiously being juxtaposed to that of Weltanschauung. The latter is
taken, more or less, in a neutral sense, i.e. as the totality of world views, while the
former is conceived as a repressive phenomenon of consciousness.
10. Louis Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx: The Genesis and Triumph of

Economic Ideology (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1983),
p. 17.
11. Ibid,, p. 113.
12. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 10.

13. The point probably is that these terms seem to lose their originally neutral theoretical meanings by employing them in a political discourse directed against
Marxism (taken as a source of inexorable historic laws) and Communism. It is basically a problem of the post-Communist countries where the traditions of both critical social thought and sociology are extremely weak.
14. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 11.

15. My working hypothesis would be that the most rigid and militant forms of
nationalism emerge as the sociocultural compensation of the absence of individualism in its primary and authentic shape rather than as hypostasized individualism. The
idea of national independence and liberty, by a historical paradox, is being enormously valorized in those (sub)cultures where the idea of individual independence
and freedom is neglected. The former may be perceived as nothing but an inversion
of the latter.
16. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 120, writes on Herder: "In German
thought, Herder is at the origin of one of the two currents or lineages of thought, the
more distinctly romantic one; but his thought also spills into and influences the other,

more universalistic current. Outside Germany he has deeply influenced the acculturation and nationalism of peoples later exposed to the full impact of modern values,
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especially the Slavic-speaking peoples of central and eastern Europe [italics mine]."

Instead of "acculturation," Dumont might have been concerned with what shape
Herder's ideas have acquired after being accepted by those countries.
17. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 11.

18. On the tradition of freedom and anarchy in Chinese civilization (particularly on
the tradition of tzu-yu, i.e. "self-initiating"), see Wolfgang Bauer, China and the
Search for Happiness: Recurring Themes in Four Thousand Years of Chinese

Cultural History (New York: The Seabury Press, 1976), pp. 131-153.
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24. Ibidem.

25. Dumont's critique of modernity as well as his critical emphasis on the enormous
increasing if one's power (the latter being conceived of as the social effect of the dangerously released individualism and, consequently, of the neglect of hierarchy conceived of as the stabilizing framework and the basic principle for the whole society)
perhaps springs up from the Catholic cultural-ideological background. His interpretation of the German Reformation might prove this hypothesis.
26. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 30.
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